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Abstract 
Purpose: To investigate how supply chain risks can be identified in both collaborative and 
adversarial buyer-supplier relationships (BSRs). 
Design/methodology/approach: A multiple case study involving ten Chinese manufacturers 
with two informants per organisation. Data has been interpreted from a multi-level social capital 
perspective (i.e. from both an individual and organisational level), supplemented by signalling 
theory. 
Findings: Buyers employ different risk identification strategies or apply the same strategy in 
different ways according to the BSR type. The impact of organisational social capital on risk 
identification is contingent upon the degree to which individual social capital is deployed in a way 
that benefits the individual’s own agenda versus that of the organisation. Signalling theory 
generally complements social capital theory and helps further understand how buyers can identify 
risks, especially in adversarial BSRs, e.g. by using indirect signals from suppliers or other supply 
chain actors to ‘read between the lines’ and anticipate risks. 
Research limitations/implications: Data collection is focused on China and is from the buyer 
side only. Future research could explore other contexts and include the supplier perspective. 
Practical implications: The types of relationships that are developed by buyers with their supply 
chain partners at an organisational and an individual level have implications for risk exposure and 
how risks can be identified. The multi-level analysis highlights how strategies such as employee 
rotation and retention can be deployed to support risk identification. 
Originality/value: Much of the extant literature on supply chain risk management is focused on 
risk mitigation whereas risk identification is under-represented. A unique case-based insight is 
provided into risk identification in different types of BSRs using a multi-level social capital 
approach complemented by signalling theory.  
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1. Introduction 
Supply chain risk management (SCRM) is aimed at developing strategies for the 
identification, assessment, mitigation, and monitoring of supply chain risks (SCRs) (e.g. 
Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011). SCR can be understood as the probability of an incident 
associated with a supply chain from, e.g. individual supplier failures, leading to 
operational, tactical, or strategic level failures or irregularities (Zsidisin, 2003; Ho et al., 
2015). The importance and challenge of dealing with SCRs makes SCRM a key topic. 
Risk identification is a crucial first stage of SCRM (Neiger et al., 2009; Kern et al., 2012). 
If this stage is mismanaged, it can undermine the rest of the SCRM process (Kern et al., 
2012). Thus, it is important that organisations find effective ways of quickly and 
accurately identifying risks; and the importance of this has been acknowledged by 
leading manufacturers such as Dell, Toyota, and Motorola (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004). 
Many sophisticated approaches have been presented for identifying risks, e.g. the 
value-focused process engineering (VFPE) methodology (Neiger et al., 2009) and the 
knowledge-based supply chain risk identification system (SCRIS) (Kayis and Karningsih, 
2012). But developing and implementing these methods is costly and time-consuming 
(Chen et al., 2016), and SCRM budgets and resources are often limited. Therefore, firms 
often seek other ways of effectively identifying risks. 
It has been argued that building collaborative supply chain relationships, referring to 
“two or more autonomous firms working jointly to plan and execute supply chain 
operations” (Cao and Zhang, 2011, p. 163), can aid risk identification (Scholten and 
Schilder, 2015; Chen et al., 2016). Such relationships can help to share information 
about risks and identify risks sooner, potentially before they affect the supply chain. Yet 
although prior research has examined how collaborative buyer-supplier relationships 
(BSRs) can facilitate SCRM in general (e.g. Lavastre et al., 2014), aid in (Li et al., 2015) 
or potentially hinder (e.g. Nishiguchi and Beaudet, 1998; Villena et al., 2011) risk 
mitigation, their influence on risk identification remains empirically unexplored. 
Moreover, not all BSRs will be collaborative – and there may be good reasons why a 
more adversarial relationship exists – but the ability to identify risks remains important. 
The literature currently offers no insight into how to effectively identify SCRs in 
non-collaborative BSRs. 
Much of the limited prior empirical work on risk identification has been conducted in a 
developed country context, e.g. the UK (e.g. Roehrich et al., 2014) or USA (e.g. Lockamy 
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 2
and McCormack, 2010). There is a need to extend this work to developing countries such 
as China, which is an important Eastern destination for manufacturing where guanxi, 
which has been referred to as both a social practice for building and using interpersonal 
relationships (e.g. Chen et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2013) and as a strategy for firms to gain 
competitive advantage (e.g. Peng and Luo, 2000; Gu et al., 2008; Opper et al., 2017), 
plays a critical role in business and SCRM activities (Jia and Zsidisin, 2014). Expanding 
research in this direction may complement the extant literature on risk identification and 
provide new insights for practice. 
In this paper, we present empirical evidence from ten manufacturing firms in China, 
examining how buyers identify risks in different types of BSRs. The dyadic BSR 
represents the smallest unit of analysis for studying important supply chain phenomena. 
We seek to address the following research question: 
 
How does the nature of the buyer-supplier relationship affect supply chain 
risk identification? 
 
Our analysis is aided first by social capital theory and second by signalling theory. 
Social capital theory is our primary, a-priori theoretical lens. It can be defined as “the 
sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and 
derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, p. 243). This definition acknowledges that social capital 
may reside at both an individual and an organisational level. Indeed, inter-firm 
relationships almost always depend on individuals connecting people affiliated with other 
firms. The owners of organisations therefore do not always control these connections and 
consequently cannot always profit from them (Sorenson and Rogan, 2014). Thus, it is 
necessary to consider social capital at both an individual and an organisational level to 
understand how BSRs influence risk identification. The context (i.e. China) chosen for 
this study also necessitates the application of social capital from a multi-level theoretical 
perspective. Guanxi, which is closely related to individual social capital, is cultivated by 
managers in their personal relationships (Park and Luo, 2001). This is in contrast to 
organisational-level social capital, which is often not easily transferable or traded 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Yet, there are also negative aspects of guanxi (Gu et al., 
2008) that relate to the dark-side of social capital in BSRs (Villena et al., 2011). The prior 
supply chain management (SCM) literature however has focused on a single level of 
social capital analysis – using data to capture and measure the construct at the 
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organisation level only. 
Although social capital theory is of high utility for understanding collaborative BSRs, 
we find that it does not adequately enhance our understanding of how risks can be 
identified in adversarial BSRs. We therefore supplement social capital theory with 
signalling theory (Spence, 1973), which helps us to understand how buyers can 
overcome the information asymmetry that often exists in an adversarial BSR to identify 
potential risks that the supplier may not otherwise disclose to the buyer. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews literature 
relating to risk identification and BSRs before explaining our rationale for using social 
capital theory, demonstrating its fit with SCR research and outlining why it is necessary 
to apply it at both an organisational and individual level. Section 3 discusses the research 
method adopted before an overview of SCRs and risk identification strategies is 
presented in Section 4 together with an analysis of the case study evidence from a 
multi-level social capital perspective. Signalling theory is then used to complement social 
capital theory in Section 5 before we discuss our overall findings and present five 
propositions in Section 6. The paper concludes in Section 7, where we highlight key 
theoretical and managerial implications. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 SCR Identification 
Risk identification aims to discover all relevant risks (Kern et al., 2012); to reveal 
different risk types; and, to develop an understanding of the events and conditions driving 
risks (Narasimhan and Talluri, 2009). Kern et al. (2012) demonstrated that a company’s 
risk identification endeavours can augment the level of risk analysis, which in turn 
enhances risk mitigation. This implies that an early judgement in risk identification is 
needed to determine whether a risk is relevant and thus should be further assessed (Faisal 
et al., 2006) and/or mitigated (Enyinda et al., 2010). 
Much of the literature on SCR identification has sought to: (i) identify drivers (e.g. 
Peck, 2005; Roehrich et al., 2014), sources (e.g. Ritchie and Brindley, 2007), and 
consequences of SCRs (e.g. Ceryno et al., 2015); (ii) classify SCRs (e.g. Rangel et al., 
2015); or (iii) propose risk identification strategies/approaches (e.g. Neiger et al., 2009). 
Researchers have also applied these risk identification strategies in specific industries, 
such as automotive (e.g. Xie et al., 2009) and pharmaceuticals (e.g. Kayis and Karningsih, 
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2012; Elleuch et al., 2014), especially in a developed country context (e.g. Lockamy and 
McCormack, 2010; Roehrich et al., 2014). This line of work includes complex 
approaches, e.g. the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) (Gaudenzi and Borghesi, 2006), 
the value-focused process engineering (VFPE) methodology (Neiger et al., 2009), and 
the knowledge-based supply chain risk identification system (SCRIS) (Kayis and 
Karningsih, 2012); and the use of technology, e.g. label-card systems (Xie et al., 2009) 
and supply network decision support systems (Basole and Bellamy, 2014). Adopting 
these approaches however is time-consuming and resource-intensive, making them 
infeasible for many firms. Although simpler approaches exist, e.g. the Ishikawa diagram 
and value stream mapping (Lavastre et al., 2012), firms may need to find other 
cost-effective ways (Chopra and Sodhi, 2014) of identifying risks. One such approach is 
by building trusting relationships with suppliers, allowing information and knowledge 
about risks to be shared (Scholten and Schilder, 2015; Chen et al., 2016). 
Building collaborative relationships with suppliers could aid risk identification 
(Badurdeen et al., 2014), but empirical evidence is needed to fully unpack how the 
nature of the BSR affects risk identification. Although it seems logical that 
buyer-supplier collaboration would be beneficial, it remains unclear how it aids risk 
identification and whether it always has a positive effect. For example, is it possible to 
be too collaborative? Moreover, given that not all BSRs will be collaborative, there is a 
need to understand how buyers can cost-effectively identify risks in non-collaborative 
relationships. 
 
2.2 BSRs and SCR Identification 
There are various typologies of BSRs in the literature, including those based on 
power-dependence (e.g. Cox, 2004), relational attributes (James and Faizul, 2000), and 
both relational and power-dependence (Tangpong et al., 2015). We follow the approach 
adopted in most prior studies on BSRs and SCRM, which is to focus on relational 
attributes, e.g. trust and collaboration (Li et al., 2015; Scholten and Schilder, 2015). Thus 
we use the prevailing bipolar BSR typology of collaborative-adversarial relationships 
(e.g. Carr and Pearson, 1999) where a collaborative relationship is characterised by 
closely-tied actors (Carr and Pearson, 1999) and an adversarial relationship by 
arm’s-length actors (James and Faizul, 2000). 
There is some literature that advocates developing collaborative BSRs to effectively 
identify SCRs (Khan et al., 2008; Badurdeen et al., 2014) and enhance warning 
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capabilities (Riley et al., 2016). It has been suggested that various supplier performance 
indicators can be used to identify potential risks concerning, for example, inventory 
levels, production throughput, capacity utilisation, delivery lead times (Giannakis and 
Louis, 2011), infrastructure status, and financial stability (Schoenherr et al., 2008). 
Indeed, picking up on these cues or early-warning signs may help identify potential 
disruptive events before they occur (Blackhurst et al., 2008; Bode et al., 2014; Bühler et 
al., 2016) thereby improving the proactiveness and effectiveness of risk identification. 
There remains however limited empirical evidence; and, to the best of our knowledge, 
no prior studies have empirically investigated how to identify risks in both collaborative 
and adversarial BSRs. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Lens: Social Capital Theory and Its Relevance to Risk Identification  
Social capital theory, with its three dimensions of structural, relational, and cognitive 
capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), can be used to explore how networking 
relationships bring value to actors such as individuals or organisations (Leenders and 
Gabbay, 1999) by enabling them to access resources embedded in those relationships 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) and by facilitating actions (Adler and Kwon, 2002). For 
example, Toyota develops social capital by creating and fostering social relations 
between personnel from within Toyota and from its suppliers to improve performance 
(Liker and Choi, 2004). It is therefore the theory frame adopted in this study. Social 
capital theory has recently been used to view BSRs in SCR research in order to: (i) 
explain the relationship between buyer and supplier (Cheng et al., 2012); (ii) bridge from 
inter-organisational relationships to resilience (Johnson et al., 2013); and (iii) study the 
antecedents of opportunism (Hartmann and Herb, 2014). None of these studies however 
explored how social capital influences SCR identification. 
Social capital theory has been increasingly adopted in SCM research during the past 
decade (Krause et al., 2007; Villena et al., 2011; Roden and Lawson, 2014), but the use of 
social capital as a multi-level construct is rather limited (Payne et al., 2011; Kwon and 
Adler, 2014). Prior studies have implicitly imported the individual-level mechanism for 
social capital to the organisational level by collecting data from individuals whilst 
treating the organisation as the unitary actor – with the same sets of motivations, 
cognitions and emotions as individuals, such as the ability to trust one another (Sorenson 
and Rogan, 2014). In other words, using the individual as the unit of observation but 
treating the organisation as the unit of analysis. Undoubtedly, such importation has 
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 6
contributed to an improved understanding of BSRs and performance outcomes. But the 
link between social capital and performance has been theorised in general terms only. 
There is a need to look closer at the precise nature of how social capital influences risk 
identification in a multi-level context. 
Within a BSR, we use the term individual social capital to refer to an individual’s 
personal connections with his/her counterpart in the partner organisation and the 
information, influence, and solidarity derived from these connections (see Figure 1). We 
note that social capital as represented by the three dimensions – structural, cognitive, and 
relational – resides at both the individual and organisational level. 
 
[Take in Figure 1] 
 
The following subsections specify the meaning of each social capital dimension for 
risk identification. It is however noted that there are also interactions between the 
dimensions (Li et al., 2014), e.g. social interaction (i.e. structural dimension) is viewed as 
a prerequisite for creating trust (i.e. relational capital), which promotes common interests 
and mutual understanding (i.e. cognitive capital). It should also be noted that the 
following uses a broad interpretation of social capital as prior SCM research has not 
tended to differentiate between organisational and individual level social capital. 
 
2.3.1 Structural Capital and SCR Identification 
Structural capital refers to the “properties of the social system and of the network of 
relations as a whole” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, p. 244). Burt (2004) explained it deals 
with who you reach and how you reach them; and it encompasses the structural 
configuration, diversity, centrality, and boundary-spanning roles of network participants 
(Krause et al., 2007). In BSRs, practices of building structural capital may range from 
general sharing of codified information to sharing tacit knowledge (Krause et al., 2007; 
Li et al., 2014). It also incorporates supplier evaluations and supplier development 
activities, such as visits to suppliers’ facilities and supplier training (Krause et al., 2007). 
A higher level of structural capital is therefore likely in collaborative BSRs than in 
adversarial BSRs. For example, information exchanges are expected to be more detailed, 
intricate, and proprietary when the relationship is collaborative (Krause et al., 2007; 
Lawson et al., 2008). 
Information and knowledge sharing is generally seen as critical to identifying SCRs 
(Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005) and to enhancing early warning capabilities (Riley et al., 
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2016). For example, sharing risk-related information can allow the buyer to identify 
possible threats before they become actual risk events (Li et al., 2015). Without 
information, or if suppliers hold back information (Li et al., 2015), buyers may hesitate to 
act on SCRs (Riley et al., 2016). But sharing information could also be a source of 
vulnerability (Sharma and Routroy, 2016). For example, a supplier may decide to use 
proprietary information against the buyer for their own gain. This suggests that one 
strategy for identifying risks (information sharing) could potentially induce other, new 
risks (e.g. information risk or intellectual property risk). Therefore, it is expected that 
different levels of structural capital in different BSRs will affect the outcomes of risk 
identification initiatives. 
 
2.3.2 Cognitive Capital and SCR Identification 
Cognitive capital refers to “those resources providing shared representations, 
interpretations, and systems of meaning among parties” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, p. 
244). Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) suggested that cognitive capital is embodied by shared 
visions and collective goals among partners. Thus, a higher level of cognitive capital is 
expected in collaborative than in adversarial BSRs. For example, collaborative BSRs are 
likely to develop shared norms and values (Moran, 2005) and have a common 
understanding of what constitutes improvement and how to accomplish it (Krause et al., 
2007). In contrast, if goals and values are incongruent, buyer-supplier interactions could 
lead to misinterpretation and conflict (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). 
Cognitive capital could improve understanding of SCRM between buyer and supplier, 
which could reduce errors, conflicts, and confusions (Li et al., 2015), enabling SCRs to 
be identified sooner (Faisal et al., 2006). By developing a shared understanding of SCRM, 
firms can improve their learning capabilities (Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009) and have 
a better understanding of the knowledge and information specific to SCRs that is 
available to share with partners (Cao and Zhang, 2011; Li et al., 2015). It has however 
been suggested that a groupthink mentality can emerge that produces forms of collective 
blindness (Villena et al., 2011). Actors become too homogenous in their thinking leaving 
the buyer less likely to critically evaluate risk-related information. Thus, there is the 
potential for too much cognitive capital, which could hinder proactive risk identification. 
 
2.3.3 Relational Capital and SCR Identification 
Relational capital refers to “the kind of personal relationships people have developed 
with each other through a history of interactions” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, p. 244). 
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 8
This dimension often concerns the characteristics and qualities of individual relationships, 
and the identity that a particular individual has within a network (Inkpen and Tsang, 
2005). Relational capital comprises trust, cooperation, buyer dependence, supplier 
dependence, expectations, and obligations (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Krause et al., 
2007). Thus there is the potential for major differences in relational capital between 
collaborative and adversarial BSRs (Krause et al., 2007). The high level of relational 
capital likely in collaborative BSRs can help reduce transaction costs (Ojala and Hallikas, 
2006), enhance cooperation (Villena et al., 2011), and reduce opportunistic behaviour 
(Faisal et al., 2007; Hartmann and Herb, 2014) even if short-term incentives exist (Li et 
al., 2015). The lower level of relational capital likely in adversarial BSRs, where buyers 
have limited information concerning a supplier’s behaviour, technology, and costs, may 
lead to the supplier taking advantage of their private knowledge (Camuffo et al., 2007). 
A lack of trust is considered a major contributor to SCR (Faisal et al., 2006; Lavastre et 
al., 2012). Thus, a higher level of relational capital has been associated with lower 
perceived risk (Cheng et al., 2012; Mishra et al., 2016). Moreover, trust can be 
considered a predictor of risk-sharing behaviour between supply chain parties (Jüttner, 
2005; Li et al., 2015), thereby simplifying the complex decision-making process (Chen et 
al., 2016) in risk identification (Barker et al., 2010). But trust is also a fragile asset and is 
subjected to numerous stresses in a business environment (Spekman and Davis, 2004). 
Moreover, there is the potential for heightened risk if the buyer becomes over-dependent 
on a supplier (Govindan and Chaudhuri, 2016) and the supplier abuses the buyers’ trust. 
Few studies however have recognised this problem (Villena et al., 2011). 
 
2.4 Assessment of the Literature 
Most prior studies concerning the role of BSRs in SCRM have focused on how 
collaboration may enable or hinder risk mitigation in the context of developed countries. 
Further research is needed to investigate the role of BSRs in risk identification 
particularly in developing countries such as China, e.g. to understand the role of 
country-specific practices (e.g. guanxi) in risk identification. Moreover, not all BSRs 
will be collaborative – and there may be good reasons why a more adversarial 
relationship exists – but the ability to identify risks remains important. Empirical research 
is therefore required to examine how both collaborative and non-collaborative BSRs 
influence risk identification. Moreover, few prior studies on SCRM have made use of 
theory. Greater use of established theory frames would deepen understanding and add 
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 9
external validity. Although prior studies have examined the social capital-performance 
link in general terms, further research is needed to study social capital at both an 
individual and organisational level. In response, we adopt a multi-case study approach to 
explore the role of BSRs in shaping risk identification in China. We begin by using 
social capital theory as a multi-level theoretical lens and later supplement this with 
signalling theory to further our understanding. 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1 Research Design 
The case study method (Meredith, 1998; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) adopted in this 
study is appropriate given the nascent state of the literature on the phenomenon 
(Edmondson and McManus, 2007). A multiple case study approach is applied to help 
guard against observer bias, augment external validity (Voss et al., 2002; Yin, 2014), and 
support theory building (Barratt et al., 2011). Four key measures for establishing the 
validity and reliability of case research (McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993; Stuart et al., 
2002; Yin, 2014) are summarised in Table I with a description of how each has been 
addressed. The remainder of this section outlines the case selection process, data 
collection procedure, and data analysis approach. 
 
[Take in Table I] 
 
3.2 Case Selection 
A case is defined as the buyer firm. We are interested in their experiences of SCR 
identification and in their upstream relationships with suppliers. Case selection is guided 
by theoretical interests rather than statistical sampling logic (Eisenhardt, 1989; Stuart et 
al., 2002; Yin, 2014). Four criteria for selection were specified: (i) organisations should 
be based in China; (ii) access to multiple suitable interviewees must be available to aid 
triangulation; (iii) organisations should have a number of upstream suppliers; and (iv) 
firms should have experiences of identifying SCRs. In addition, the focus was on 
manufacturers, i.e. the focal firms in product supply chains making them a good starting 
point for theory development (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). 
We selected ten cases, as summarised in Table II, which meet the above criteria. This 
number of cases works well according to Eisenhardt (1989) and Barratt et al. (2011) and 
allowed us to reach theoretical saturation (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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[Take in Table II] 
 
3.3 Data Collection 
The main data collection method has been semi-structured interviews. This approach 
provides a relatively open format yet is still focused on specific issues, allowing the 
researcher to guide the interviewee through the areas to be discussed (Easterby-Smith, 
1991; Saunders et al., 2016). Interviews were conducted via telephone or video telephony 
for logistical reasons where the latter still allows the non-verbal behaviour of participants 
to be observed. Interviews were audio-recorded (and video-recorded) contributing 
towards an accurate, unbiased record and allowing for direct quotations (Voss et al., 2002; 
Saunders et al., 2016). 
The interview questions (see Appendix A), which were sent to participants in advance, 
covered two main themes. First, the major SCRs that manufacturers in China have 
encountered or anticipate and the risk identification strategies employed (Appendix A, 
Section 2). And second, the linkages between BSRs, SCR, and risk identification 
(Appendix A, Section 3). The interview protocol was piloted with two interviewees. This 
led, for example, to using a sample list of SCRs to aid interviewees. Secondary data, e.g. 
from corporate reports, was used to triangulate the interviewees while websites provided 
background knowledge prior to an interview. 
 
3.4 Data Analysis 
Interviews were conducted in Chinese and fully transcribed using the 
translation-back-translation method (Brislin, 1970). Data analysis followed a three-step 
process of data reduction, data display, and conclusions (Mil s and Huberman, 1994) 
supported by the use of qualitative data analysis software NVivo, which facilitates the 
coding process and data management. We started by assigning codes to extracts that were 
truly relevant to the research question. The transcripts were read several times to increase 
familiarity with the data, reduce the data, and refine the codes. The relevant data were 
coded to create new or apply existing nodes by the first author; a second author was also 
involved in coding development to reduce subjective bias. First-order codes were 
descriptive and close to the SCRM literature, e.g. SCR types and risk identification 
strategies. Second-order analysis involved moving back-and-forth between the theory 
and data to reveal new constructs, including factors that support (enablers) and hinder 
(barriers) each dimension of social capital. The content of the nodes was continuously 
reviewed and discussed until final agreement was reached to ensure consistency. The data 
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analysis process continued until it was saturated (Robson, 2011). 
 
4. Findings: A Multi-Level Social Capital Perspective 
Before interpreting the data using social capital theory, we first provide an overview of 
the SCRs and identification strategies, as shown in Table III. If one or more interviewee 
from a given firm identified a risk or strategy, it was considered relevant to that firm. The 
data contains 43 SCRs categorised into three broad types from Christopher and Peck 
(2004). More specifically, 4 SCRs are external to the supply chain; 28 are internal to the 
supply chain but external to the organisation, further broken down into supply-side risks 
(22), demand-side risks (4), and network-related risks (2); and 11 were internal to the 
organisation. The most frequently mentioned SCRs were quality, price, and logistics 
related. In addition, 16 risk identification strategies are included in the table. Most 
strategies were initiated and adopted by buyers, particularly supplier evaluations and 
auditing. But other parties, including suppliers, customers, and third-party organisations 
also play a role in identifying SCRs. 
 
[Take in Table III] 
 
Enablers and barriers to the three dimensions of social capital at both an organisational 
and individual level are summarised in Table IV, while example quotations are given in 
tables V to VII. Enablers of organisational level social capital support the formalisation 
and accumulation of organisational social capital and are particularly evident in 
collaborative BSRs while barriers to organisational social capital work against the 
formalisation and accumulation of organisational social capital and explain why 
organisational social capital is typically low in adversarial BSRs. 
We differentiate between enablers and barriers of individual and organisational social 
capital in terms of whom – the organisation or employee – has the ability to exercise 
control over the relationship and to experience any accrued benefits. Following this line 
of reasoning, factors such as personal guanxi, enabling employees in the buyer firm to 
overcome institutional barriers and instability in the face of regulatory changes and to 
exchange favours, can be classified into enablers of individual social capital. Whilst other 
factors, such as multiple points of contact in the supplier firm, which weaken an 
employee’s ability to exercise control over a relationship and mean he/she cannot enjoy 
the potential benefits for themselves, can be classified as barriers to individual social 
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capital. Note that personal guanxi enables all three dimensions of individual social capital 
and therefore appears in tables V to VII. We recognise that guanxi is a potential 
double-edged sword and that a dark side can exist, e.g. in the form of collusion. However, 
we identify the latter, rather than guanxi itself, as the barrier to individual social capital. 
 
[Take in Table IV] 
 
4.1 Structural Dimension of Social Capital 
Table IV identifies six enablers and seven barriers to organisational structural capital; and 
two enablers and three barriers to individual structural capital. Example quotes from the 
interviews can be found in Table V. 
 
[Take in Table V] 
 
4.1.1 Organisational Structural Capital and Risk Identification 
Some risk identification strategies are more likely to be employed in collaborative BSRs 
because they rely, e.g. on detailed and timely information. For example, enablers of 
organisational structural capital, including corporate communication and regular 
meetings, illustrate why supplier development activities such as co-location of employees 
are mainly adopted in collaborative BSRs. HealthCare’s Sourcing Leader noted: “We 
maintain strict standards to monitor and control the raw materials provided by key 
suppliers. For instance, we house our supplier quality engineers at the suppliers’ factory.” 
Such strategies enable regular information sharing and facilitate buyer-supplier 
interactions, thereby identifying risks earlier, i.e. at a supplier’s site. The shared 
information can help the buyer anticipate the types, likelihood and consequences of 
potential risks. For example, Furniture’s Supply Chain Manager explained: “We have a 
regular meeting forum with our key suppliers once or twice a month. Suppliers share 
their predictions and forecasts about the market, including price fluctuations for raw 
materials.” 
When integrated practices such as the above cannot be employed, the buyer may rely 
on other strategies, e.g. inspecting goods at the buyer’s site, to reactively identify risks. 
As the buyer will be embedded in a wider network, it can also use connections with other 
firms, e.g. a supplier’s competitors, to identify potential SCRs. These practices however 
are not always effective meaning problems are only identified after the product reaches 
the market. For example, PetPro’s Supplier Quality Assurance (SQA) Manager stated: 
“We did not realise there was a printing error with dates [i.e. incorrect ‘used by’ dates] on 
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our products until we received complaints from customers.” 
Barriers to organisational structural capital can expose firms to certain risks. For 
example, the barrier – a lack of participation – was found to expose a buyer in an 
adversarial relationship to financial risk. Auto’s Brand Manager explained: “Suppliers in 
a difficult relationship are not willing to share information, especially about their 
financial performance.”, which limited the buyer’s options and pushed it to rely on other 
strategies, e.g. “using a third-party organisation” to identify potential risks. Barriers, 
such as a supplier’s competitors and organisational chaos, were also found to distort 
information flow and assimilation, impairing the proactiveness and effectiveness of risk 
identification. 
 
4.1.2 Individual Structural Capital and Risk Identification 
Like organisational structural capital, individual structural capital enabled by 
interpersonal communication and guanxi can positively affect risk identification. It can 
provide an alternative mechanism that enables firms to bypass institutional hurdles and 
contractual control. Resin’s Quality Engineer noted: “If we and the supplier need to deal 
with a risk incident through contracts, this implies that we do not really have good guanxi 
[relationship].” Instead, interpersonal communication allows for more flexible 
conversations and joint problem-solving activities, as explained by Furniture’s Sales & 
Marketing Manager: “We don’t actually rely on the contracts unless there are issues. Even 
though there are some contractual issues in very rare situations, we try to communicate 
and solve all kinds of risks and problems.” Consequently, these enablers of individual 
structural capital can help reduce a firm’s exposure to certain risks. For example, 
financial risk may occur in collaborative BSRs but is less likely due to the openness of the 
guanxi. Alum’s Finance Manager stated: “Some suppliers in a good guanxi with us may 
just call us directly and ask for a favour. They may have a recent problem with capital 
turnover and wonder if we can support them. We will shorten the accounts payable 
payment terms or pay cash on delivery.” 
Barriers to individual structural capital were found to damage risk identification 
performance. For example, different points of contact in the supplier firm lead to limited 
information sharing with buyer representatives, making it difficult to develop individual 
structural capital and effectively identify potential risks. Some barriers, including 
collusion and limited capacity to process information, illustrate why collaborative BSRs 
may not always have a positive influence on risk identification. HealthCare’s Sourcing 
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Leader explained: “One of our collaborative suppliers suddenly shut down their factory 
… the supplier provided all of the statements we needed, we cannot blame anyone else 
because we failed to recognise any problems in the evaluation process.” Information was 
being shared, but the sourcing leader did not have the capacity to process it meaning the 
risk was not anticipated. 
 
4.2 Cognitive Dimension of Social Capital 
Table IV identifies four enablers and one barrier to organisational cognitive capital; and 
two enablers and three barriers to individual cognitive capital. Example quotes can be 
found in Table VI. 
 
[Take in Table VI] 
 
4.2.1 Organisational Cognitive Capital and Risk Identification 
A high level of organisational cognitive capital is supported by an increased tacit 
understanding, which can help limit unexpected behaviour and misunderstanding. In 
particular, shared cognition can help reduce the cognitive load and calculative effort 
involved in risk identification tasks that, to some extent, require a degree of shared 
understanding (e.g. shared language, culture, and mutual awareness). Consequently, a 
shared understanding helps the buyer to predict and anticipate potential risks. The data 
suggests that although risks concerning, for example, quality, price, and logistics exist in 
collaborative BSRs, buyers in collaborative BSRs may perceived there to be a lower 
likelihood of them occurring than in adversarial BSRs due in part to the development of 
joint understanding and shared goals. Resin’s Purchasing Manager explained: “Some 
trustworthy suppliers have been working with us for more than ten years. Risks in price, 
quality, and delivery exist but are much lower.” Collaborative BSRs also tend to feature 
more of the enabling factors of organisational cognitive capital, e.g. providing training to 
suppliers. Candy’s Site Quality Manager explained: “We provide regular training to our 
suppliers to help them establish a quality management culture. We also invite them to visit 
our factories to understand our requirements better.” 
Data on organisational cognitive capital suggests buyers may employ the same risk 
identification strategy in different ways according to the BSR type. Many of the buyers 
interviewed used strategies such as supplier evaluations and auditing across all of their 
suppliers, but the level of cognitive capital affected how this strategy was implemented 
and its impact on risk identification performance. PetPro’s SQA Manager explained: “For 
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assured suppliers in strategic partnerships with us, we evaluate and audit once every 
three years. It’s two years for approved suppliers and one year for in-development 
suppliers.” Enablers such as training and standardisation facilitate the formalisation of 
shared goals and values creating expected norms of behaviour, resulting in less reliance 
on regular supplier evaluations and auditing in collaborative than in adversarial BSRs. 
The actor taking responsibility for risk identification can shift from buyer to supplier 
when the two parties are cognitively aligned. For example, suppliers may initiate 
activities or inform buyers about anticipated risks. PetPro’s SQA Manager stated: “Our 
strategic suppliers do root cause analysis on their own and use tools like fishbone 
analysis.” In these situations, both the buyer and supplier form a shared understanding of 
the actions required to maintain their business relationship. But barriers that hinder 
cognitive capital and alignment, including miscommunication, can affect risk 
identification performance meaning buyers are unable to identify risks before an event 
occurs. Resin’s Quality Engineer recalled: “Because the supplier didn’t communicate 
properly, we didn’t realise the risk until it happened.” Such a low level of organisational 
cognitive capital is often found in adversarial BSRs. 
 
4.2.2 Individual Cognitive Capital and Risk Identification 
Individual cognitive capital is also supported by personal guanxi. Medicine’s Senior 
Purchasing Manager stated: “Of course, good established guanxi is essential in the risk 
management process as we both [buyer and supplier representative] are willing to build 
long-term collaboration.” These shared cognitions increase the tendency to interact with 
similar individuals in supplier firms. In collaborative BSRs, individual cognitive capital, 
enabled by tacit understanding and agreement, can make buyers predict a lower 
likelihood of certain risks occurring, including quality risk. When these risks however do 
occur, they can have a severe impact (e.g. on order fulfilment), as explained by 
HealthCare’s Sourcing Leader: “We have to stop our production line because there are 
quality issues in one part provided by the key supplier X ... They either have no issues at 
all or have huge impacts.” 
The barriers to individual cognitive capital in the data took the form of collective 
blindness and a lack of absorptive capacity. Barriers lead to misunderstandings, confusion, 
and conflicts, which could explain why certain risks such as quality problems are more 
likely in adversarial BSRs where cognitive capital is typically low. Candy’s Lean 
Manager explained: “Some suppliers might not really understand our requirements or 
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why we have such quality requirements. We explain everything to them in detail. After we 
reach the agreement, problems are quickly resolved.” As adversarial BSRs tend to be 
characterised by low purchasing spend and multi-sourcing, the buyer can also switch to 
alternative sources of supply, meaning the impact can also be relatively low. 
A higher level of individual cognitive capital may not always be beneficial to risk 
identification. This is because individuals think alike and can become less likely to 
critically evaluate potential risks, which inhibits risk identification performance. Tyre’s 
Quotation Manager explained: “We often turn a blind eye in most cases, e.g., when the 
supplier cannot meet the on-time delivery targets. Of course, I know this would bring loss 
to our company.” 
 
4.3 Relational Dimension of Social Capital 
Table VII identifies three nablers and four barriers to organisational relational capital; 
and three enablers and three barriers to individual relational capital. Example quotes can 
be found in Table VII. 
 
[Take in Table VII] 
 
4.3.1 Organisational Relational Capital and Risk Identification 
Due to a high level of organisational relational c pital, shared cooperation norms can lead 
to a buyer perception that some risk types are less likely in collaborative BSRs than in 
adversarial BSRs. Indeed, trust in collaborative BSRs can facilitate joint efforts in 
identifying risk. Meanwhile, the buyer may anticipate that quality risk and opportunism 
risk appear more likely in adversarial BSRs where trust is lower and suppliers may 
behave unethically. For example, Alcohol’s General Manager stated: “Some suppliers 
opportunistically plot to do something to us, such as increase the price or mix 
impurities.” 
The data on organisational relational capital also suggests different risk identification 
strategies are employed by buyers in different BSRs. For example, a lack of inter-firm 
trust in adversarial suppliers leads buyers to adopt certain strategies that they would not 
employ with collaborative suppliers, e.g. an unannounced inspection. Candy’s Lean 
Manager explained: “For those suppliers in ‘transactional’ relationships, we sometimes 
perform unannounced inspections. We go directly to their sites without informing them to 
get to know their actual performance and identify risks.” Auto adopts similar practices, 
but uses a third-party auditor because the supplier also does not trust the buyer and is not 
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willing to disclose its financial performance to them directly. This shows that relational 
and structural dimensions of social capital can be used together to understand the 
adoption of risk identification strategies in different BSRs. 
Barriers to organisational relational capital, such as exposure to opportunism, can help 
to understand how opportunism (including intellectual property theft) can occur in 
collaborative BSRs. HealthCare’s Sourcing Leader explained: “As they [the supplier] are 
involved in the very early design stage, it is very likely that they take away our technology 
and other confidential information.” This is a negative consequence of using early 
supplier involvement to encourage interaction during the design and planning phase. 
Further, it demonstrates that a barrier of organisational relational capital (i.e. exposure to 
opportunism) together with an enabler of organisational structural capital (i.e. corporate 
communication) can explain why an unexpected opportunism risk may occur in 
collaborative BSRs. Other barriers, such as a lack of firm-level trust (particularly in 
adversarial BSRs) and reduced monitoring (specifically in collaborative BSRs), can 
reduce the proactiveness and effectiveness of risk identification. 
 
4.3.2 Individual Relational Capital and Risk Identification 
Individual relational capital is shaped by affective commitment based on notions of doing 
favours, reciprocity and emotional attachment. A high level of individual relational 
capital enabled by factors such as personal guanxi can lead to a buyer’s perception that 
supply shortage risk appears less likely in collaborative BSRs. Alcohol’s General 
Manager claimed: “We have good guanxi with [Supplier X]. If they know that our order is 
very urgent, they will unload the moulding tools of other buyers and prioritise our 
production plans.” A higher level of interpersonal trust in relationships, enabling higher 
individual relational capital, promotes information sharing as part of the formalisation of 
individual structural capital. Moreover, information sharing reinforces the buyer’s ability 
to foresee and identify possible risks. Resin’s Quality Engineer explained: “A supplier in 
a good guanxi would inform us in advance that they might deliver late, and they would 
offer us options like ‘wait until the full order is ready’ or ‘deliver part of the order on 
time’.” Thus, such good guanxi enables the buyer to become aware of risks earlier. 
Barriers to individual relational capital, such as a lack of motivation to switch supplier 
because of the fear of potential loss of guanxi, can help to further understand why buyers 
in collaborative BSRs may become more likely to expose themselves to some risks such 
as quality risk. Auto’s Brand Manager argued: “Even if quality cannot be assured, 
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Chinese guanxi will mean we are reluctant to switch to a better supplier for fear of losing 
current relationships or because we prefer to keep working with friends we have known 
for many years ... this lowers standards.” Other barriers, such as a lack of skills and 
experience, can make it difficult to employ certain strategies to identify risks, e.g. 
analysing historical events. Alum’s Supply Chain Manager claimed: “Some of our 
purchasing staff are quite inexperienced. They are not yet capable of establishing 
business relationships with big suppliers, of communicating with suppliers’ top 
management, or of improving relationships.” Together with another barrier, changing 
purchasing managers, these factors can lead to the loss of guanxi, making it more difficult 
to identify risks effectively. 
 
4.4 Cross-Level Effects of Social Capital on Risk Identification 
Social capital in a buyer-supplier dyad is created through a micro-macro process that 
crosses two distinct levels (i.e. individual and organisational) and generates cross-level 
effects on risk identification. We now identify the following mechanisms relating to these 
cross-level effects: (i) convergent effects, whereby the aims and incentives of individuals 
within the buyer firm are congruent with the aims and incentives of the buyer firm, 
meaning that even if there is a low level of social capital between organisations, a high 
level of social capital between individuals can still lead to positive effects for the buyer 
firm; and, (ii) divergent effects, whereby the aims a d incentives of the individuals within 
the buyer firm are incongruent with the aims and incentives of the buyer firm, meaning 
that individuals may pursue their own agenda and this may be against the interests of the 
buyer firm, thus undermining any organisational impact. These two mechanisms are 
based upon the assumption that the owners of the firms are motivated to pursue 
organisational interests whereas the individuals that are employed by the firms may or 
may not always act in the organisational best interests, resulting in convergent and 
divergent effects on risk identification. 
These two mechanisms were found in both types of BSRs, thus creating four quadrants, 
as shown in Figure 2. Quadrant 1 refers to convergent effects in an adversarial BSR. This 
happens when an individual in the buyer firm approaches their correspondent in the 
supplier firm, with whom he/she has interpersonal ties, for a favour in a business 
exchange. Such positive effects brought about by individual social capital can help firms 
maintain inter-firm exchanges even if the supplier lacks firm-level trust with the buyer 
firm, thereby facilitating risk identification activities in adversarial BSRs. This case 
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reflects individual social capital complementing organisational social capital in a positive 
way. Quadrant 2 refers to convergent effects in a collaborative BSR. This can be seen 
from, for example, how personal guanxi can enable supplier firms to prioritise the 
production and delivery needs of the buyer over those of other buyers in collaborative 
BSRs. This scenario is considered the best case for the buyer firm in terms of risk 
identification as the individual social capital reinforces the positive effects of 
organisational level social capital. Quadrant 3 refers to divergent effects in an adversarial 
BSR, where the negative effects of individual social capital, such as caused by collusion, 
can hurt risk identification in adversarial BSRs. We describe this as the worst case for the 
buyer firm in terms of risk identification as the buyer appears to lose the initiative and 
control of the relationship. Finally, Quadrant 4 refers to divergent effects in a 
collaborative BSR. This indicates that individual social capital is not always reciprocal 
with organisational social capital, meaning individuals can use their personal ties to 
pursue their own agenda against organisational interests. The organisation cannot profit 
from these personal ties and therefore cannot benefit in terms of risk identification. 
 
[Take in Figure 2] 
 
4.5 Assessement Based on the Multi-Level Social Capital Perspective 
Overall, the findings suggest there are enablers and barriers that influence the 
formalisation and accumulation of both organisational and individual social capital 
within BSRs. The level of organisational social capital is a strong indicator of the type of 
BSR, with implications for SCR and risk identification. A buyer may perceive there to be 
differing degrees of likelihood and consequence of certain SCRs depending on the BSR 
type. For example, a buyer may expect quality risk to be very likely in an adversarial BSR 
(e.g. due to a lack of involvement) and that although it is expected to be less likely to 
occur in a collaborative BSR, when it does occur the consequences can be severe, e.g. due 
to the volume of business or degree of integration. In terms of risk identification, buyers 
may employ different strategies or apply the same strategy in different ways according to 
the BSR type. 
It should also be noted that although the three dimensions of social capital at an 
organisational and individual level are theoretically different, they can be difficult to 
separate empirically in relation to risk identification. In fact, there are cross-level effects 
(i.e. convergent and divergent effects) of organisational and individual social capital on 
risk identification. Convergent effects appear more likely in collaborative relationships, 
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allowing buyers to identify risks earlier than in adversarial BSRs, leading to more 
proactive and effective risk identification. It was also found that buyers in adversarial 
BSRs may still be able to effectively identify risks when the convergent effects are in 
place. Divergent effects that unexpectedly occur in collaborative BSRs can have a 
negative impact on risk identification, e.g. resulting from collusion and collective 
blindness. 
Social capital theory has utility here but has provided arguably only limited insight 
into how buyers can identify risks in adversarial BSRs. Given that not all BSRs will be 
collaborative, it is important that buyers can also identify risks in non-collaborative BSRs. 
We therefore introduce a second theoretical lens, signalling theory, which allows us to 
understand how buyers can overcome the information asymmetry that particularly exists 
in adversarial relationships to identify risks; it can also be used to further examine 
information sharing in collaborative relationships meaning it complements social capital 
theory. 
 
5. Findings: Signalling Theory Perspective 
Signalling theory is best known for its application to labour markets where education (i.e. 
qualifications) is considered a signal of an employee’s (or applicant’s) qualities that 
overcomes information asymmetry in the employer-employee relationship (Spence, 
1973). The use of signalling theory has also gained recent attention in the field of 
operations and SCM (e.g. Stevenson and Busby, 2015; Jayasinghe, 2016). In signalling 
theory, the two key parties are the sender and receiver of signals. In general, the sender 
must choose the frequency and method of sending information while the receiver must 
interpret the signal (Connelly et al., 2011). 
The supplier is likely to know much more about supply-side risks to the buyer unless 
they disclose information. We classify signals into: (i) direct signals, i.e. where a supplier 
voluntarily and deliberately discloses information about risk to the buyer; and (ii) indirect 
signals, i.e. where the suppliers’ actions or communications contain information about 
risk but where this disclosure is not the purpose of the action or communication. Our 
choice of signalling theory, and this classification, partly emerged from the data. For 
example, Medicine’s Purchasing Director explained: “We use strong [direct] and weak 
[indirect] signals to evaluate if the supplier has any risks in our evaluations and auditing 
process or during usual communication.” 
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5.1 SCR from a Signalling Perspective 
Table VIII provides an overview of signals identified in the data, indicating the signal 
type (direct vs. indirect), the BSR type where a signal was observed (collaborative vs. 
adversarial), and the implied risk type. An example direct signal is a supplier promising 
not to increase prices even though market prices are rising, which is a direct indication to 
the buyer that price risk is low. Meanwhile, a high staff turnover at a supplier may be an 
indirect signal to the buyer of imminent quality problems due to a loss of expertise. The 
table identifies thirteen direct and ten indirect signal types from supplier to buyer. Twelve 
of the direct signals were evident in collaborative BSRs and only two in adversarial BSRs 
while all ten indirect signals were only identified in adversarial BSRs. Thus, the dominant 
signal type appears to be related to the form of BSR.  
Direct signals about risks are mainly emitted by suppliers in collaborative BSRs, 
which is logical given that we would expect information to be openly shared here. In 
contrast, buyers must mainly rely on indirect signals in more adversarial BSRs. For 
example, a supplier may request early payment on an invoice, and this may be an indirect 
signal to the buyer of financial problems for the supplier, which is a risk to longer term 
supply. Medicine’s Purchasing Director explained: “Take our packaging supplier as an 
example, we normally pay them every three to four months. When they call us one or two 
months early asking if we could pay them, we then need to be very careful. Is this because 
they have financial problems, their cash flow broke down or any other issues?” The same 
risk can of course occur in a collaborative BSR, but the supplier may signal more directly 
and be supported by the buyer avoiding the risk coming to fruition. Alum’s Finance 
Manager stated: “Some suppliers in a good guanxi [relationship] with us may just call us 
directly and ask for a favour. They may have a recent problem with capital turnover and 
wonder if we can support them. We will shorten the accounts payable payment terms or 
pay cash on delivery.” 
 
[Take in Table VIII] 
 
While the above signal-BSR relationship is generally the case, there are exceptions, 
including where adversarial suppliers send direct signals to buyers. In particular, 
adversarial suppliers arguably invest in gaining ISO 14001 certification to send a direct 
signal to buyers about their commitment to the environment and the low level of 
sustainability risk. In a more collaborative relationship with greater transparency, this 
commitment would arguably be clear to the buyer regardless of the certification; but in 
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more adversarial relationships, ISO 14001 becomes an important signalling device. Of 
course, it is also important because certification is increasingly becoming an order 
qualifier for many buyers. Thus, it is not an asset that is specific to a single BSR – it can 
help the supplier in its transactions with other (new and existing) buyers. 
Finally, in our study, we limit our interest to signals carrying information about risk 
from the supplier (sender) to the buyer (receiver), although there are many other signals 
in the signalling environment that the buyer may also receive and interpret to identify 
risks. For example, negative news reports about a supplier, product recalls by competitors 
that source from the same supplier, and a supplier being unable to fulfil the demand of 
another customer may all suggest potential supply risks to the buyer. Such signalling is 
beyond the scope of this paper but warrants more investigation in the future. 
 
5.2 Risk Identification from a Signalling Perspective 
Connelly et al. (2011) presented a generic timeline (from t=0 to t=3) for the signalling 
process between signaller and receiver where a signal is sent by the signaller and 
received/interpreted by the receiver (followed by feedback to the signaller). We now 
contextualise this timeline by making the supplier the sender/signaller and the buyer the 
receiver; and we expand it to indicate that (i) the supplier may (or may not) have an 
incentive to misrepresent their actions/intentions and (ii) the buyer may (or may not) have 
the capacity to interpret the signal correctly, as illustrated in Figure 3. These dimensions 
are also used in Figure 4, which provides a 2x2 classification of suitable risk 
identification strategies observed in the data. Hence it identifies four types of risk 
identification strategies: interactive, adaptive, passive, and reactive strategies. The x axis 
refers to the receiver’s (buyer’s) capacity to interpret the signal correctly (or not) and the 
y axis refers to the signaller’s (supplier’s) incentive to misrepresent (or not) their 
intentions. The latter appears to be related to the type of BSR, i.e. suppliers in adversarial 
BSRs are more likely to have an incentive to misrepresent than suppliers in collaborative 
BSRs. 
 
[Take in Figure 3 & Figure 4] 
 
In Quadrant 1 of Figure 4, the supplier does not have an incentive to misrepresent and 
the buyer has the capacity to correctly interpret data or actions. This means the buyer can 
employ “interactive” strategies to identify risks, such as by evaluating suppliers and 
inspecting goods at the buyer’s site. As the supplier does not have an incentive to 
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misrepresent, the buyer can trust them and take them at face value. In Quadrant 2, 
suppliers do have an incentive to misrepresent their actions but the buyer still has the 
capacity to correctly interpret data or actions. Therefore, the buyer can employ more 
“adaptive” strategies, including unannounced inspections, inspecting goods before they 
leave the supplier’s site, and by attempting to translate observed abnormal supplier 
behaviour into likely risks. 
In Quadrant 3, the supplier does not have an incentive to misrepresent but the buyer is 
unable to interpret correctly. It may therefore need to employ a “passive” strategy where 
it relies on interpretations by other actors, such as via third-party inspections. There is 
limited evidence in this quadrant as the buyer is normally able to interpret and translate 
direct signals sent by a supplier with no incentive to misrepresent into identified risks. 
Finally, in Quadrant 4, the supplier has an incentive to misrepresent but the buyer is 
unable to interpret correctly. Here, a buyer may be completely unaware of a potential risk 
until it materialises or is independently identified by another party, e.g. via customer 
complaints or feedback from other supply chain actors. We describe these as “reactive” 
approaches to risk identification. 
 
5.3 Assessement Based on Social Capital and Signalling Theories 
Signalling theory has been used to complement social capital theory, demonstrating how 
risks can be identified in collaborative and adversarial BSRs. As discussed above, from a 
multi-level social capital perspective, buyers can improve risk identification through the 
development of overall social capital and by converging the aims and incentives of 
individuals with those of the organisational agenda. Meanwhile, the data suggests that the 
dominant form of signalling is dependent on the BSR type, i.e. direct signals about risks 
are mainly emitted by suppliers in collaborative BSRs while more indirect signals are 
found in adversarial BSRs. Thus, although it is difficult to identify risks through the 
relationship if it is adversarial, especially when there are divergent effects, buyers can 
improve risk identification by picking up on the predominantly indirect signals sent by 
suppliers and by choosing suitable strategies from Figure 4. Indirect signals provide the 
buyer with an opportunity to ‘read between the lines’ and translate received signals into 
risks; and this means buyers can find ways to identify risks even when suppliers do not 
openly disclose or share information or the buyer cannot benefit from their employees’ 
personal ties. In more collaborative BSRs, direct signals allow the buyer to effectively 
identify risks by ‘reading on the lines’. If divergent effects appear in collaborative 
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relationships, risk identification suffers although signals can once again be used to boost 
risk identification to some degree. 
 
6. Discussion 
The results from this study provide four key findings and lead to the formulation of five 
propositions. First, enablers and barriers of the three dimensions of social capital at both 
an organisational and individual level have been identified. These factors help explain 
why buyers in different types of BSRs may anticipate SCRs with differing degrees of 
likelihood and consequence. For example, there appears to be a higher probability but 
lower impact of quality risk in adversarial BSRs and a lower probability but higher 
impact in collaborative BSRs. This insight adds, for example, to the debate around 
whether trust impedes (Cheng et al., 2012; Li et al., 2015; Mishra et al., 2016) or induces 
opportunism (Chen et al., 2016). Our data suggests this depends on the presence of 
divergence between organisational and individual social capital, e.g. caused by collective 
blindness. Although earlier SCR studies (Cheng et al., 2012; Johnson et al., 2013; 
Hartmann and Herb, 2014) have used social capital theory, they have tended to neglect 
interactions between the three dimensions, let alone examined interactions across 
organisational and individual levels. In line with the wider OM literature (Liao and 
Welsch, 2005; Li et al., 2014), we have found that these interactions add explanatory 
power and provide a more nuanced understanding of risk identification in different 
BSRs. For example, different combinations of the dimensions of social capital at both 
levels can help to explain unexpected risks in collaborative BSRs. For instance, a barrier 
to individual relational capital (collective blindness) combined with an enabler of 
organisational relational capital (long relationship history) explains why financial risk 
exists in collaborative BSRs. Meanwhile, the data suggests buyers may employ different 
risk identification strategies or apply the same strategy in different ways according to the 
BSR type. For example, an unannounced inspection is more likely with adversarial than 
with collaborative suppliers. This leads to our first two propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: A buyer’s evaluation of the likelihood and consequences of a given SCR is 
dependent on the type of BSR. 
 
Proposition 2: Buyers may employ different risk identification strategies or apply the 
same strategy in different ways according to the type of BSR. 
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Second, we find that social capital operates at both an individual and organisational 
levels of analysis to affect risk identification. This multi-level approach builds on 
previous studies on social capital at a single level (Lawson et al., 2008; Whipple et al., 
2015). Furthermore, enablers for building up organisational social capital were most 
evident in collaborative BSRs. Enablers of individual social capital however can appear 
in both types of BSRs, e.g. personal guanxi enables all three dimensions of individual 
social capital. Hence, our newly identified enablers and barriers to both organisational 
and individual social capital contribute to the extant BSR literature but particularly to that 
on SCRM. Our study lends support to previous studies on the dark side of social capital 
(Villena et al., 2011) and extends this stream by identifying the two distinct cross-level 
effects, i.e. convergent and divergent effects in different types of BSRs (see Figure 2). In 
doing so, we refine the existing SCRM literature by suggesting a multi-level social capital 
perspective, i.e. convergent effects reinforce the positive impact of collaborative BSRs on 
risk identification, but more importantly, offer those buyers in adversarial BSRs an 
alternative route to, for example, overcoming institutional hurdles and contractual control 
(Xin and Pearce, 1996; Shou et al., 2016), thereby improving their risk identification. 
Moreover, divergent effects can impair the proactiveness and effectiveness of risk 
identification, not only in collaborative BSRs but also in adversarial BSRs. This leads to 
the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: Social capital resides in BSRs at different levels of analysis (i.e. at an 
organisational level and an individual level). The impact of organisational social capital 
on risk identification is contingent upon convergence with individual social capital. 
Convergence with individual social capital reinforces the positive effects of 
organisational social capital and divergence induces negative effects. 
 
Third, our signalling analysis suggests that the dominant form of risk signalling may 
depend on the type of BSR. Few prior studies have referred to risk signalling between 
actors in the form of early warning indicators (Craighead et al., 2007; Xie et al., 2009; 
Bode et al., 2014), and none of these contributions explicitly referred to signalling theory. 
However, our findings are in line with these studies in terms of the importance of early 
warning indicators for detecting and mitigating risks. We also claim to add to the wider 
literature on signalling processes (Connelly et al., 2011) by expanding two dimensions 
from signalling theory within the context of BSRs. It was found (from the perception of 
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buyers) that adversarial suppliers are more likely to have an incentive to misrepresent 
than collaborative suppliers. Hence, more indirect signals were found in adversarial 
BSRs and more direct signals in collaborative BSRs. Therefore:  
 
Proposition 4: There is a relationship between the signal type received by a buyer from 
a supplier and the type of BSR. In adversarial BSRs, buyers will mainly receive indirect 
risk signals from suppliers. In collaborative BSRs, buyers will increasingly receive 
direct risk signals from suppliers. 
 
Fourth, we find that signalling theory offers a new insight into how buyers can identify 
risks. This is particularly advantageous in adversarial BSRs where there is information 
asymmetry. Risk signalling may be a strong and direct signal from one actor to another, 
alerting the other party to a potential risk event. But it could also be a weaker, indirect 
signal. For example, it has been suggested that a supplier requesting faster payment may 
indicate supplier cash flow problems and financial risk (Bode et al., 2014). Such 
signalling can inform the buyer about potential SCRs. Indeed, previous studies have also 
stressed how screening early indicators and building warning capabilities are essential to 
the success of SCRM (Craighead et al., 2007; Kern et al., 2012). Buyers can interpret 
signals to identify risks in a quick and effective way, including by ‘reading between the 
lines’ to translate indirect signals into risks. In more collaborative BSRs, direct signals 
allow the buyer to effectively identify risks by ‘reading on the lines’. This allows risks to 
be identified in both adversarial and collaborative BSRs, leading to our final proposition: 
 
Proposition 5: Direct and indirect signals can be used to identify the type of risks to 
which the supply chain is exposed in collaborative and adversarial BSRs. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper started by asking: How does the nature of the BSR affect SCR identification? 
We collected data from ten Chinese manufacturers and analysed it from a multi-level 
social capital perspective, complemented by signalling theory. We have been able to 
extend existing knowledge by identifying the enablers and barriers to social capital at 
both levels in a developing country context. Furthermore, a buyer may perceive there to 
be differing degrees of likelihood and consequence of certain SCRs and either employ 
different risk identification strategies or apply the same strategy in different ways 
depending on the BSR type. The impact of organisational social capital on risk 
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identification is suggested to be contingent upon convergence with individual social 
capital, i.e. convergence of the aims and incentives between the two levels reinforces the 
positive impact of organisational social capital and divergence induces negative effects. 
Social capital theory however failed to offer sufficient explanation concerning how 
buyers can identify risks in adversarial BSRs. We have shown that it is still possible to 
identify risks in adversarial relationships by picking up on the indirect risk signals. 
Further, signalling theory provided a new perspective for classifying suitable risk 
identification strategies into interactive, adaptive, passive, and reactive approaches 
(Figure 4). 
 
7.1 Theoretical Implications 
This study sheds light on how the BSR influences risk identification in a developing 
country context. It advanc s social capital as a multi-level theoretical lens and explains 
how social capital operates at both an individual and organisational level of analysis to 
affect an organisational-level outcome, i.e. risk identification performance. This 
represents an important contribution to social capital theory that responds to the research 
gap identified by Payne et al. (2011). The findings show that understanding individual 
level social capital is important to understanding organisational level social capital. We 
identified two different mechanisms relating to the cross-level effects of organisational 
and individual social capital on risk identification. Finally, we have demonstrated the 
value of using signalling theory to complement social capital theory, adding explanatory 
power to risk identification particularly in adversarial BSRs. 
 
7.2 Managerial Implications 
This study aids managerial understanding of how the types of relationships buyers 
develop with supply chain partners impact the SCRs they are exposed to; and this 
awareness may help managers better anticipate and predict potential risks, allowing 
them to select appropriate strategies to proactively identify risks. Meanwhile, firms 
should pay attention to individual social capital, evaluate whether the aims of 
individuals converge with those of the organisation, and determine how best to manage 
and exploit the relationships between supply chain professionals and individuals in 
supplier firms. For example, the findings highlight the importance of retaining supply 
chain professionals that have strong individual ties with suppliers for the good of the 
overall BSR. Equally, the findings highlight the importance of having multiple contacts 
or rotating professionals for protecting the organisation from possible negative effects 
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when the employed individuals are motivated to act in their own best interests and those 
interests run contrary to those of the organisation. Thus, firms in both adversarial and 
collaborative BSRs should encourage their employees to use individual social capital to 
produce benefits for the organisational purpose; and in doing so, firms can improve risk 
identification through the development of overall social capital and by fostering 
convergence between organisational and individual social capital.  
In addition, the insights reveal that buyers need to consider how risks can best be 
identified in the context of a given BSR. It may be, for example, that firms that have 
adversarial relationships with suppliers need to become competent at reading between 
the lines to intercept and interpret risk signals. In other words, establishing learning 
capabilities for the risk signalling process could help firms to better anticipate potential 
risks. Equally, suppliers themselves need to be aware that buyers may be able to learn 
about risks not only from their direct actions but also from their indirect actions and 
consider how this should impact their behaviour.  
 
7.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This study is based on a qualitative research design. Thus it is acknowledged that the 
results may lack external validity and the conclusions may be idiosyncratic (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Future research could therefore involve a large-scale survey to add generality. 
Further, only the buyer perspective in the BSR has been captured; hence, future research 
could extend the work to include suppliers. Although we used the BSR as the smallest 
unit of analysis to study how supply chain relationships affect risk identification, we have 
found evidence that other supply chain actors, such as customers, other buyers and 
competitors also play a role in identifying SCRs, indicating more research could be done 
in this direction. Similarly, the work could be extended to other stages of the SCRM 
process. Future research could also explore this topic in other countries where culture 
may play a different role than in China (guanxi). Our findings show that there are 
cross-level effects on risk identification between the different levels of social capital. 
Further research could investigate the impact of other organisational characteristics on 
the cross-level effects in this context, such as firm size, established routines, and industry 
sector. Finally, future research could explore how research on SCRM and on supplier 
relationship management can be more formally integrated. 
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Table I Summary of Research Credibility  
Evaluation Criteria 
Actions Taken Across Four Phases of the Research 
Research Design Case Selection Data Collection Data Analysis 
Construct Validity  
(establishes correct 
operational measures for the 
concepts being studied) 
Developed a protocol based 
on the extant literature and 
a priori theoretical lens. 
N/A 
Piloted the protocol with two 
interviewees; multiple sources of 
evidence and interviewees. 
Informants’ validation of 
case study report; 
obtained feedback from 
fellow researchers on 
case analysis. 
Internal Validity  
(establishes a causal 
relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are shown to lead 
to other conditions, as 
distinguished by spurious 
relationships) 
Established the evidence 
from the literature. 
Case included leading 
manufacturers from 
various industries. 
Two interviewees per company; 
triangulation supported by 
secondary data largely from 
websites and corporate reports (or 
equivalent). 
Pattern matching. 
External Validity  
(establishes a domain in 
which the study’s findings can 
be generalised) 
Used replication logic (i.e. 
replicate on analytical 
rather than statistical 
generalisation); multiple 
case study design. 
Carefully selected 
interview participants, 
including referrals from 
the first to the second 
interviewee. 
N/A N/A 
Reliability  
(demonstrates that the 
operations of a study can be 
repeated with the same 
results) 
Developed a case study 
protocol. 
Selected cases based on 
theoretical sampling. 
Provided the (semi-structured) 
questions to all interviewees before 
the interview; developed a case 
study database (transcripts, 
quotations, matrix, codes, memos, 
etc.) in NVivo. 
Involved another 
researcher who did not 
collect the data; two 
scholars were involved in 
the development of 
coding. 
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Table II Overview of Case Study Companies 
Company Interviewee Position Main Products 
No. Employees 
(approx.) 
Annual Sales 
(in Million RMB) 
Candy 
Lean Manager 
Candy and other confectionery products 1,500-2,000 8,000 
Site Quality Manager 
PetPro 
Supplier Quality Assurance (SQA) Manager 
Pet care products 1,000-1,500 1,500 
Senior Lean Manager 
Alum 
Finance Manager 
Aluminium extruded products 1,000-1,500 16,000 
Supply Chain Manager 
Furniture 
Supply Chain Manager 
Furniture 1,000-1,500 300 
Sales & Marketing Manager 
Tyre 
Quotation Manager 
Tyres and inner tubes 7,000-7,500 3,000 
Purchasing Assistant 
Resin 
Quality Engineer 
Synthetic resin materials 500-1,000 1,400 
Purchasing Manager 
HealthCare 
Sourcing Leader 
Medical equipment 6,000-6,500 50,000 
Supplier Quality Engineer 
Alcohol 
General Manager 
Alcohol 100-150 11 
Purchasing Manager 
Medicine 
Purchasing Director 
Pharmaceutical products 200-300 20 
Senior Purchasing Manager 
Auto 
Regional Business Development (RBD) Manager 
Automobiles and other motor vehicles 4,000-4,500 8,500 
Brand Manager 
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Table III Summary of Supply Chain Risks and Risk Identification Strategies 
Supply Chain Risk/ 
Identification Strategy 
Description (Number of Case Companies out of 10) 
External to the Supply 
Chain (ESC) 
ESC1 Natural disasters (3) 
ESC2 Political risk (1) 
ESC3 Regulation and policy risk (5) 
ESC4 Other irregular events (1) 
(External to the 
organisation but) 
Internal to the Supply 
Chain (ISC) 
Supply-side 
ISC1 Failure to supply required quantity (1) 
ISC2 Interrupted supply or supply shortage (3) 
ISC3 Lack of sufficient capacity (2) 
ISC4 Logistics related risks (8) 
ISC5 Packaging risk (2) 
ISC6 Price risk (9) 
ISC7 Financial instability including bankruptcy (5) 
ISC8 Technological risk (4) 
ISC9 Quality risk (10) 
ISC10 Single source of supply (5) 
ISC11 Sustainability related risk (6) 
ISC12 Contract breach (4) 
ISC13 Moral hazard (7) 
ISC14 Service risk (2) 
ISC15 Lack of supplier involvement (4) 
ISC16 Supplier opportunism including intellectual property risk (5) 
ISC17 Corruption reporting from other suppliers (1) 
ISC18 Product redesign (2) 
ISC19 Supplier labour procurement (1) 
ISC20 Unavailable or limited local sourcing (3) 
ISC21 Wrong choice of supplier (3) 
ISC22 Reputation risk (2) 
Demand-side 
ISC23 Changes in customer requirements (1) 
ISC24 Market price fluctuation (3) 
ISC25 Seasonal demand (2) 
ISC26 Single customer (strong power) (2) 
Network-related 
ISC27 Collusion (2) 
ISC28 Hoarding and price gouging (2) 
Internal to the 
Organisation (ORG) 
ORG1 Behavioural issues (1) 
ORG2 Corruption (2) 
ORG3 Delayed payments to suppliers (1) 
ORG4 Exploiting suppliers (1) 
ORG5 Internal coordination problems (1) 
ORG6 Power cut (1) 
ORG7 Lack of purchasing skills (1) 
ORG8 Unbalanced power between departments (1) 
ORG9 Unsound purchasing system (1) 
ORG10 Production stoppage (1) 
ORG11 Lack of risk awareness (1) 
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Risk Identification 
Strategies 
RIS1 Observed supplier’s abnormal behaviour (9) 
RIS2 Unannounced inspections (1) 
RIS3 Buyer performs cause-effect analysis (1) 
RIS4 Scenario analysis (2) 
RIS5 Site inspection at supplier’s factory (incl. co-location of employees) (5) 
RIS6 SWOT analysis (1) 
RIS7 Supplier performs cause-effect analysis (1) 
RIS8 Supplier evaluation (3) 
RIS9 Historical events (2) 
RIS10 Sampling check during supplier selection (1) 
RIS11 Inspection of goods at buyer’s factory (5) 
RIS12 Customer complaints (4) 
RIS13 Customs inspection (1) 
RIS14 Feedback from downstream supply chain (1) 
RIS15 Feedback from other buyers (1) 
RIS16 Third-party inspection (3) 
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Table IV Enablers and Barriers to Social Capital at the Organisational and Individual Levels 
 Organisational Level Individual Level 
 Enablers Barriers Enablers Barriers 
Structural 
Capital 
Adoption of IT systems and 
software; 
Corporate communication; 
Local sourcing (including supplier 
transfer); 
Regular meetings & forums; 
Supplier directory; 
Supplier’s contacts (or network) 
Lack of timely communication; 
Lack of top management 
support; 
Lack of participation; 
Long distance; 
Lack of visibility; 
Supplier’s competitors; 
Conflicts among departments 
(organisation chaos) 
Interpersonal 
communication; 
Personal contacts 
(guanxi) 
 
Different points of contact; 
Collusion (between an internal actor and 
prospective supplier); 
Limited capacity to process information 
Cognitive 
Capital 
Shared codes and language; 
Shared culture; 
Standardisation; 
Training 
Lack of standards; 
Miscommunication 
Personal contacts 
(guanxi); 
Tacit understanding or 
agreement 
Lack of absorptive capacity; 
Collective blindness 
Relational 
Capital 
Relationship history/length; 
Firm-level loyalty; 
Firm-level reciprocity 
Supplier staff turnover; 
Lack of firm-level trust; 
Exposure to supplier 
opportunism; 
Reduced monitoring 
Personal contacts 
(guanxi); 
Commitment; 
Goodwill 
Change in personnel (purchasing 
managers); 
(Lack of) motivation to switch supplier; 
Lack of purchasing skills or experience 
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Table V Enablers and Barriers to Organisational and Individual Structural Capital 
(O = Organisational; I = Individual) 
 
Structural Capital 
(Information sharing; Supplier 
development; Supplier evaluation) 
Illustrative Quotes (Examples) 
Enablers 
Adoption of IT systems and 
software (O) 
HealthCare’s Supplier Quality Engineer: “We have an online information system to monitor supplier 
performance such as on-time delivery.” 
Tyre’s Quotation Manager: “We use SRM [supplier relationship management] software to manage and 
evaluate our suppliers.” 
Corporate communication (O) 
Alcohol’s General Manager: “We try our best to solve problems through negotiation and communication. 
There is always a way for us to deal with these risks and both of us [buyer and supplier] can make some sort of 
concession.” 
Local sourcing (including 
supplier transfer) (O) 
HealthCare’s Sourcing Leader: “It is much easier to manage local suppliers compared to overseas suppliers. 
We can go and visit local suppliers whenever they have problems. Besides, there is no time difference and no 
need to have telephone conferences every day.” 
Regular meetings & forums 
(O) 
Furniture’s Supply Chain Manager: “We have a regular meeting forum with our key suppliers once or twice a 
month. Suppliers share their predictions and forecasts about the market, including price fluctuation for the 
raw materials.” 
Supplier directory (O) 
Medicine’s Senior Purchasing Manager: “…it is beneficial to establish our supplier database so that we can 
track their performance.”  
Supplier’s contacts (or 
network) (O) 
Furniture’s Sales & Marketing Manager: “…our suppliers will find alternative scarce raw materials for us 
through either their suppliers or their peer companies. Their peer companies will help each other in most 
cases.” 
Interpersonal communication 
(I) 
Furniture’s Sales & Marketing Manager: “We don’t actually rely on the contracts unless there are issues. 
Even though there are some contractual issues in very rare situations, we try to communicate and solve all 
kinds of risks and problems.” 
Personal contacts (guanxi) (I) 
Alum’s Finance Manager: “Some suppliers in a good guanxi [relationship] with us may just call us directly 
and ask for a favour. They may have a recent problem with capital turnover and wonder if we can support 
them. We will shorten the accounts payable payment terms or pay cash on delivery.”  
Barriers 
Lack of timely communicate 
(O) 
Resin’s Quality Engineer: “Some suppliers should have informed us earlier before the risk events occurred. 
They might not have the awareness to inform us in advance.” 
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Lack of top management 
support (O) 
Resin’s Quality Engineer: “To be honest, no one will remind their line manager that this supplier is risky until 
some risks occur, unless this manager is the ‘big boss’ and fully supports in managing supplier risks.” 
Lack of participation (O) 
Auto’s Brand Manager: “Our strategic suppliers would take part and cooperate in our audit and evaluation. 
They are willing to share information with us. However, other suppliers in a difficult relationship are not 
willing to share information, especially about their financial performance. Then we have to investigate using 
a [anonymised] third-party organisation to know their financial status.” 
Long distance (O) 
Alcohol’s General Manager: “We don’t have single sourcing in case the single supplier is unable to supply us. 
We also have concerns when a supplier is too far from us.” 
Lack of visibility (O) 
HealthCare’s Sourcing Leader: “Part of the reason why we transfer suppliers to China is to try to reduce the 
upstream risks. … it is very difficult to know what’s happening on their sites [when the supplier is outside of 
China].” 
Auto’s Brand Manager: “We are now thinking to integrate and optimise our supplier base as the current 
suppliers are fragmented.” 
Supplier’s competitors (O) 
Resin’s Purchasing Manager: “The competition for contracts between suppliers can also cause us problems. 
For example, one of our purchasing managers once bought equipment at a lower price from Supplier A [than 
had been quoted by Supplier B]. Afterwards, Supplier B [a competitor to Supplier A] reported collusion [i.e. 
price fixing] between this purchasing manager and Supplier A to our boss.” 
Conflicts among departments 
(organisation chaos) (O) 
Alum’s Supply Chain Manager: “In the purchasing process, organisation chaos causes a series of purchasing 
problems. For example, the finance department was given too much power and authority. As a result, they 
made many doubts on items bought in the purchasing department. They have the right to deny purchasing 
orders, but by that time the purchased item was already used and we need to pay the suppliers. The finance 
department would not process the payments. This is a very serious problem. In a word, it is about the 
unbalanced power between the purchasing department and finance department. And of course there is no 
visibility. It is not very clear on the ownership and responsibility of each department. This can cause us many 
risks.” 
Different points of contact (I) 
HealthCare’s Sourcing Leader: “Actually, there are different contact windows from this supplier company. 
Their sales team are more likely to care about our attitudes when buying their materials. However, when I 
need to talk to their production department to add a new requirement on this material, their production 
manager does not care and seems like they do not want to talk with me. Who knows how his bad attitude 
influences his company.”  
Collusion (between an 
internal actor and prospective 
Resin’s Quality Engineer: “One old supplier has been replaced by our new senior technology manager. This 
manager informed the purchasing department that the old supplier is not qualified anymore and a new 
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supplier) (I) supplier with a lower price has been identified. He asked to do business with this supplier. You can see the 
power of selecting suppliers is not within the control of the purchasing department.” 
Medicine’s Senior Purchasing Manager: “Suppliers provide inaccurate prices to us in the tender process. 
They can be dishonest in order to win the bidding. For example, they try to ascertain the prices quoted by 
other suppliers then submit a lower price to bid. Certainly, our staff should not have disclosed the bidding 
information. If this supplier wins the bid, the quality of raw materials is a potential threat to us as their price 
is unexpectedly lower.” 
Limited capacity to process 
information (I) 
HealthCare’s Sourcing Leader: “One of our collaborative suppliers suddenly shut down their factory with no 
reason. I really doubt how our finance department evaluated that suppliers’ financial status several months 
ago. How come they didn’t find out any warning signs in the supplier’s financial statements? The supplier 
provided all of the statements we needed, we cannot blame anyone else because we failed to recognise any 
problems in the evaluation process.” 
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Table VI Enablers and Barriers to Organisational and Individual Cognitive Capital 
(O = Organisational; I = Individual) 
 
Cognitive Capital 
(Shared paradigm; Collective goals) 
Illustrative Quotes 
Enablers 
Shared codes and 
language (O) 
HealthCare’s Sourcing Leader: “… doing business with Chinese [local] suppliers is much easier. You know, there 
is no time difference and the same language.” 
Shared culture (O) 
Candy’s Lean Manager: “We encourage our suppliers to manage risks according to our requirements. For 
example, in order to increase their awareness on quality management, we encourage them to learn our corporate 
culture and principles.” 
Standardisation (O) 
Candy’s Site Quality Manager: “We have many standard documents for managing our suppliers.” 
PetPro_1: “We manage our suppliers according to our ‘working bible’, material quality management standard.” 
Training (O) 
Candy’s Site Quality Manager: “We provide regular training to our suppliers to help them establish a quality 
management culture. We also invite them to visit our factories to understand our requirements better.” 
Personal contacts (guanxi) 
(I) 
Medicine’s Senior Purchasing Manager: “Of course, good established guanxi is essential in the risk management 
process as we both [buyer and supplier] are willing to build long-term collaboration.” 
Tacit understanding or 
agreement (I) 
Candy’s Lean Manager: “Some suppliers might not really understand our requirements or why we have such 
requirements. We explain everything to then in detail. After we reach the agreement, problems are quickly 
resolved.” 
Medicine’s Purchasing Director: “We already achieved the tacit understanding and agreement after working 
together for a long time.” 
Barriers 
Lack of standards (O) 
HealthCare’s Sourcing Leader: “We check if our suppliers have a standard process. If they do have, we will check 
if they have any updates and if they are actually following the standard.” 
Miscommunication (O) 
Resin’s Quality Engineer: “Because the supplier didn’t communicate properly, we didn’t realise the risk until it 
happened.” 
Lack of absorptive 
capacity (I) 
Candy’s Lean Manager: “Some suppliers might not really understand our quality requirements or why we have 
such requirements.” 
Collective blindness (I) 
Auto’s Brand Manager: “If guanxi is not managed properly, it can cause us many problems, especially when both 
parties [buyer and supplier] turn a blind eye.” 
Tyre’s Quotation Manager: “One common risk is delivery risk. We [buyer and supplier] know each other well. We 
both know we will not go to court even if the supplier does not comply with the delivery agreements in the 
contract.” 
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Table VII Enablers and Barriers to Organisational and Individual Relational Capital 
(O = Organisational; I = Individual) 
 
Relational Capital 
(Trust; Friendship; Mutual 
obligation; Identification) 
Illustrative Quotes 
Enablers 
Relationship 
history/length (O) 
Alcohol’s General Manager: “After a long time, suppliers become our friends and will keep the same price, even 
under seasonal demand.” 
Resin’s Purchasing Manager: “Some trustworthy suppliers have been working with for more than ten years.” 
Firm-level loyalty (O) 
Furniture’s Sales & Marketing Manager: “Many suppliers have limited capabilities. It is useless to force them. 
We have requirements, such as that the supplier needs to prioritise to supply and deliver to us when the material 
is scarce in the market. If they cannot make it, we can choose not to work with this supplier when we have 
sufficient supply. So it is important for us to evaluate whether this supplier is loyal to us.” 
Firm-level reciprocity (O) 
Alcohol’s Senior Purchasing Manager: “Some suppliers are in a rapport relationship with us. We are nice to 
them in the same way that they are nice to us.” 
Personal contacts (guanxi) 
(I) 
Medicine’s Senior Purchasing Manager: “Good guanxi with suppliers allows you to do many things, of course, 
including risk management.” 
Commitment (I) 
Furniture’s Sales & Marketing Manager: “Some suppliers made commitments to us that they would hold stocks of 
raw materials for us. Therefore, they were able to keep the same price when the market price increased.” 
Goodwill (I) 
Alcohol’s Senior Purchasing Manager: “We know that they [the supplier] didn’t mean to cause quality risks on 
purpose.” 
Medicine’s Senior Purchasing Manager: “We both [buyer and supplier] rely on each other with very good 
intentions.” 
Barriers 
Supplier staff turnover (O) 
Auto’s RBD Manager: “High turnover of supplier’s staff on the production line would result in quality risk. 
Because the new employees may not have experienced skills and knowledge or they don’t really understand our 
requirements for the parts supplied.” 
Lack of firm-level trust 
(O) 
Resin’s Purchasing Manager: “Some suppliers with a good reputation have worked with us for a very long time. 
We are more like friends now. However, they now seem like they do not want to continue our business. This is not 
because they do not trust me anymore. In fact, they don’t trust our company and worry that our company is not 
able to pay them on time.” 
Exposure to supplier Auto’s Brand Manager: “We have a supplier who makes air-conditioner compressors for us. We have a specific 
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opportunism (O) requirement on the failure rate. In other words, if the failure rate of this product reaches a certain level, we will 
lodge a claim to this supplier. If the claim ratio is too high, then we will disqualify and eliminate this supplier 
because this affects the quality. However, this supplier sent people to different places like service stations and 
urged them not to report failure rates back to our factory. Rather, they will return the compressor to them. You 
know, they are worried about the claim ratio. This is the common case in China.” 
HealthCare’s Sourcing Leader: “We do have a potential risk when doing early supplier involvement. As they [the 
supplier] are involved in the very early design stage, it is very likely that they take away our technology and other 
confidential information.” 
Reduced monitoring (O) 
Alcohol’s Senior Purchasing Manager: “Some suppliers have been working with us for many years. We trust each 
other and gradually reduce the efforts of monitoring.” 
Change in personnel 
(purchasing managers) (I) 
Alum’s Supply Chain Manager: “To solve lots of problems in the purchasing department, our boss normally 
would rely on the organisation tools, e.g. change the purchasing managers and the vice president, and so on.” 
(Lack of) motivation to 
switch supplier (I) 
Auto’s Brand Manager: “Even if quality cannot be assured, Chinese guanxi will mean we are reluctant to switch 
to a better supplier for fear of losing current relationships or because we prefer to keep working with friends we 
have already known for many years.” 
Lack of purchasing skills 
or experience (I) 
Alum’s Supply Chain Manager: “Some of our purchasing staff are quite inexperienced. They are not yet capable 
of establishing business relationships with big suppliers, of communicating with suppliers’ top management, or 
of improving relationship etc. Within our company, these young purchasers cannot keep balanced relationship 
with internal customers like R&D, planning, and sales staff. Many problems and risks are emerging due to 
ill-managed internal and external relationships.” 
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Table VIII Signals (Direct and Indirect) and Potential Risks in Adversarial and Collaborative BSRs 
Signal Description 
Adversarial 
BSR 
Collaborative 
BSR 
Potential Risk(s) Illustrative Quotes 
Asking for a favour  Direct 
(Less) financial 
risk 
Alum’s Finance Manager: “Some suppliers in a good guanxi 
[relationship] with us may just call us directly and ask for a favour. They 
may have a recent problem with capital turnover and wonder if we can 
support them. We will shorten the accounts payable payment terms or pay 
cash on delivery.” 
Cash holding or good 
cash flow performance 
in a good relationship 
 Direct (Less) price risk 
Furniture’s Sales & Marketing Manager: “Some suppliers made a 
commitment to us that they would hold stocks of raw materials for us. 
Therefore, they were able to keep the same price when the market price 
increased… so these suppliers (in good guanxi) who are willing to hold 
more cash for us are our key suppliers. They can support us in hard 
times.” 
Supplier warns the 
buyer that they may 
not able to supply 
 Direct 
Supply shortage 
risk; Quality risk 
Alcohol’s Senior Purchasing Manager: “When there is a shortage of raw 
materials, we are in a passive position. Suppliers start to demand 
favourable requirements for them such as cash on delivery, reduce the 
transactions that they sell on credit, or reduce the accounts payable 
payment terms and so on. Because they have much more power, they will 
implicitly threaten that they cannot supply to you or they will rather lower 
the quality.” 
Certification (e.g. ISO 
certification) 
Direct  
(Less) 
sustainability risk; 
Quality risk 
Resin’s Quality Engineer: “For example, things like whether our 
suppliers have certifications like ISO and can meet the local requirements 
of sustainability or not etc. Why is this important? Because this can cause 
us huge problems if they were found not meeting the requirements, they 
will be punished – they must stop production for one week or one month 
and rectify and reform until it is correct. Consequently, they cannot 
delivery to us, which has a great impact on us. In the future, we will pay 
more attention to sustainability especially on environmental protection in 
our chemical industry.” 
A promise not to  Direct (Less) price risk Furniture’s Sales & Marketing Manager: “Some suppliers made 
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increase pricing 
although market prices 
are rising 
commitments to us that they would hold stocks of raw materials for us. 
Therefore, they were able to keep the same price when the market price 
increased.” 
Sharing information 
about a perceived risk 
event 
 Direct 
(Less) supply 
shortage risk 
Resin’s Quality Engineer: “The supplier in good guanxi would inform us 
in advance that they might deliver later, and they would offer us options 
like ‘wait until the full order is ready’ or ‘deliver part of the order on 
time’.” 
Building inventory for 
the buyer when the raw 
material price is low 
 Direct (Less) price risk 
Furniture’s Sales & Marketing Manager: “Some suppliers hold wood 
inventory for us when the market price is very low. We would also pay 
them in advance and support them to hold inventory for us. As a result, we 
can buy the materials at a lower price and reduce our costs.” 
Finding alternative 
sources of supply for 
the buyer 
 Direct 
(Less) supply 
shortage risk 
Furniture’s Sales & Marketing Manager: “There are some situations 
where suppliers will help us to protect against risks. For example, our 
suppliers will find alternative scarce raw materials for us through either 
their suppliers or their peer companies. Their peer companies will help 
each other in most cases.” 
Maintaining the same 
price under seasonal 
demand 
 Direct (Less) price risk 
Alcohol’s General Manager: “After a long time, suppliers become our 
friends and will keep the same price under seasonal demand.” 
Supplier offering 
continuous 
improvement 
suggestions 
 Direct (Less) quality risk 
Candy’s Lean Manager: “Suppliers will also offer improvement 
suggestions to us. For example, our packaging supplier A know we have 
issues with batch management at distributors. This supplier offered us a 
very good suggestion that we can use tapes with different colours to 
represent different months of BBD [best before date] so that the 
distributors can refer to the colour to achieve FIFO [first-in-first-out] in 
their inventory management. This would help reduce the rate of aged 
products.” 
Supplier prioritising 
delivery or service for 
the buyer 
 Direct 
(Less) supply 
shortage risk 
Furniture’s Sales & Marketing Manager: “Some of our suppliers with 
good guanxi would prioritise to supply and deliver to us when the 
material is scarce in the market.” 
Supplier prioritising 
production plans for 
 Direct 
(Less) supply 
shortage risk 
Alcohol’s General Manager: “We have good guanxi with [Supplier X]. If 
they know that our order is very urgent, they will unload the moulding 
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the buyer tools of other buyers and prioritise our production plans.” 
Service becomes 
worse 
Direct Direct Service risk 
Auto’s Brand Manager: “Suppliers’ behaviours can help us to identify 
risks. Some indicators like service becoming worse would indicate 
service risk to us.” 
Decreasing or 
discounting prices 
when the market price 
is flat 
Indirect  Quality risk 
Alcohol’s Senior Purchasing Manager: “One supplier unexpectedly told 
us that they could lower the price for us. We supposed that there were 
quality issues in that batch and this is why they wanted to sell it at a 
cheaper price” 
Requesting early 
payment 
Indirect  Financial risk 
Alum’s Finance Manager: “Some suppliers said that they can offer us 
more discounts if we can pay them earlier. This might be that they have 
issues in capital turnover or they have less cash available, indicating a 
potential bankruptcy risk to us.” 
Medicine’s Purchasing Director: “Take our packaging supplier as an 
example, we normally pay them every three to four months. When they 
call us one or two months early asking if we could pay them, we then need 
to be very careful. Is this because they have financial problems, their cash 
flow broke down or any other issues? This is concerning whether they can 
sustain their business. We would consider that it is time we initiated our 
back up plan.” 
Increasing the price 
when the market price 
is flat 
Indirect  
Price risk; 
Contract risk; 
Opportunism risk 
Alcohol’s Senior Purchasing Manager: “If the supplier initially breaches 
the contract then they will be punished. But the sudden hike in price by 
this supplier might imply that he wanted you to induce or force you to 
initiate the action to discontinue the contract. Then he would not be 
punished ... This is sensible, right? When another customer offered them a 
higher price, this is profitable for them to opportunistically breach the 
contract. In the situations where the penalty is very high, he would try all 
means to force you to initiate the action.” 
Market price increases 
but no request is made 
to increase the price 
Indirect  Quality risk 
Auto’s RBD Manager: “Suppliers are also facing the rise in raw material 
prices, indicating less profit margins for them. They fear that they would 
lose some current customers if they request to increase the price of raw 
materials. Instead, they would rather figure out how they reduce the costs 
of product structure, equipment, technology etc. and sacrifice higher 
Page 50 of 54Supply Chain Management: an International Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Supply Chain Management: an International Journal
 
 
levels of quality standard. This would be increased quality risk for us.” 
Requesting to change 
supply to another 
company 
Indirect  
Contract risk; 
Service risk 
Alum’s Supply Chain Manager: “One type of material we need is the 
cutting tool. There are various types of this product in the market. We 
choose one supplier of relatively low priced good quality tools … value 
for money. We want to purchase from this supplier. However, the supplier 
does not allow us to place orders with them. They request us to purchase 
from one of their dealers, which is a very small firm. There are no 
established business processes and systems. Although the quality of the 
cutting tools is very good, it performed badly at response speed and 
follow-up service.” 
Requesting to pay a 
sub-company 
Indirect  Contract risk 
Alum’s Supply Chain Manager: “Some suppliers request to pay a 
third-party company after you purchased from their companies. This is a 
very complicated case, remaining a risk to us.” 
Shareholder structure 
or ownership becomes 
more concentrated 
Indirect  
Financial risk; 
Supply 
interruption risk 
Auto’s Brand Manager: “Everything looks fine on the financial statements 
of … [at new supplier]. Later, we found this supplier was suffering 
financial distress as their venture capital partner [the majority 
shareholder] went bankrupt. Therefore, they cannot supply to us 
anymore.” 
A request to shorten 
accounts payable 
payment terms 
Indirect  Financial risk 
Alum’s Finance Manager: “Some suppliers request us to shorten the 
accounts payable payment terms. They probably have difficulties in their 
cash flow.” 
Staff change or 
turnover 
Indirect  Quality risk 
HealthCare’s Supplier Quality Engineer: “The job-hopping rate and staff 
turnover rate are quite high in some of our domestic suppliers. There are 
lots of issues on work handover particularly when staff suddenly leave 
without a clear handover to the new employee.” 
Auto’s RBD Manager: “A high turnover of a supplier’s staff on the 
production line would result in quality risk… because the new employees 
may not have experienced skills and knowledge or they don’t really 
understand our requirements of the parts.” 
Strategy change, e.g. 
investing in other 
markets 
Indirect  
Supply shortage 
risk 
Auto’s Brand Manager: “One supplier was gradually changing their 
investment strategy and shrinking the current production for the part they 
supply to us.” 
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Figure 1 Organisational-Level and Individual-Level Social Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Characteristics of Cross-Level Effects of Organisational and Individual Social 
Capital on Risk Identification in Adversarial and Collaborative BSRs 
 
 
 
 
Supplier 
Organisation
Buyer 
Organisation
Organisational-Level 
Social Capital
Si
Individual-Level 
Social Capital
Bi: Individual(s) in the buyer organisation
Si: Individual(s) in the supplier organisation
Bi
Quadrant 1: Convergent Effects in an 
Adversarial BSR
Description: Assets and resources made 
available through individual social capital 
that an individual can use to produce 
benefits for organisational purposes in an 
adversarial BSR, indicating why the buyer 
is able to effectively identify risks in an 
adversarial relationship.
Quadrant 2: Convergent Effects in a 
Collaborative BSR (Best Case Scenario for 
Risk Identification)
Description: Assets and resources made 
available through individual social capital 
that an individual can use to produce 
benefits for organisational purposes in a 
collaborative BSR, indicating why the 
buyer can effectively identify risks in a 
collaborative relationship.
Quadrant 3: Divergent Effects in an 
Adversarial BSR (Worst Case Scenario for 
Risk Identification)
Description: Assets and resources made 
available through individual social capital 
that an individual can use to pursue their 
own gain against organisational interests in 
an adversarial BSR, indicating why the 
buyer cannot effectively identify risks in an 
adversarial relationship.
Quadrant 4: Divergent Effects in a 
Collaborative BSR
Description: Assets and resources made 
available through individual social capital 
that an individual can use to pursue their 
own gain against organisational interests in 
a collaborative BSR, indicating why the 
buyer cannot always effectively identify 
risks in a collaborative relationship.
Adversarial BSRs Collaborative BSRs
Convergent Effects
Divergent Effects
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Figure 3 Signalling Timeline  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Classification of Supply Chain Risk Identification Strategies from a Signalling 
Perspective 
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Appendix A Interview Questions 
 
1. General Background 
1.1  Background on organisation, position, job title, and responsibilities. 
2.2  What is your understanding of buyer-supplier relationships, supply chain risk, and risk 
identification in particular? 
 
2. SCRs and Risk Identification Strategies 
2.1  Which of the following supply chain risks are most relevant to your company? 
• Inability to meet quality requirements 
• Inability to adapt to required product design or technological changes 
• Failures to make delivery requirements 
• Cannot provide competitive pricing (including sudden hike in costs) 
• Supplier opportunism (including intellectual property risk) 
• Contractual agreements 
• Single source of supply 
• Selection of wrong partner 
• Financial instability, including bankruptcy 
• Lack of supplier involvement 
• Sustainability related problems 
Are there any other supply chain risks (not listed) that are relevant to your company? 
2.2  What strategies has your company used to identify risks, and how effective have these 
been? 
 
3. Types of BSR, SCR, and Risk Identification 
3.1  What are the different types (characteristics) of working relationships with your 
suppliers? How critical is a supplier in each type to your overall business? 
3.2  How do the types of relationships you have with suppliers affect supply chain risk? 
3.3  How has working with your suppliers (with examples from different types of 
relationships) influenced risk identification? 
3.4  How would you evaluate your working relationships with your suppliers regarding 
supply chain risks and supply chain risk management? 
 
4. Final Comments 
Are there any further comments that you think are relevant to this research that either affect the 
company now or may do in the future? 
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